Traits, Imitation, and Evolutionary Dynamics

Wendelin Schnedler

No 15/2003, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: In this article, a modelling framework for the information transmission between agents in an evolutionary game setting is proposed. Agents observe traits which reaect past and present behaviour and success of other agents. If agents imitate more successful agents based on these traits, the resulting dynamics are a multivariate stochastic process. An example for such a process is simulated. The results resemble the replicator dynamics to a remarkable degree. If traits moderately depend on the past, this accelerates convergence of the dynamics towards a stable state. If the dependence is strong, the stable state is not reached.

Keywords: replicator dynamics; imitation; evolution of cooperation; information transmission; simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Traits, Imitation and Evolutionary Dynamics (2003)
Working Paper: Traits, Imitation, and Evolutionary Dynamics (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:152003

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