Executive board composition and bank risk taking

Allen N. Berger, Thomas Kick and Klaus Schaeck

No 03/2012, Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: Little is known about how socioeconomic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of financial institutions. First, we establish that age, gender, and education jointly affect the variability of bank performance. Second, we use difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements and find that younger executive teams increase risk taking, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives. In contrast, if board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, risk taking declines.

Keywords: Banks; executives; risk taking; age; gender; education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 I21 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-dem, nep-hme and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Executive board composition and bank risk taking (2014)
Working Paper: Executive Board Composition and Bank Risk Taking (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdps:032012

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