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Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government

R. Emre Aytimur ()

No 162, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Lobbying a coalition government is different than lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group likes the status quo more than the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution thanks to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. We show further that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group's preferences more heavily due to the interest group's forward-looking considerations.

Keywords: lobbying; policy-making; coalition governments; status quo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government (2014) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:162

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