Easy targets and the timing of conflict

Helmut Bester and Kai Konrad

No 21, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.

Keywords: Timing of conflict; war; easy targets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B31 D74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Related works:
Journal Article: Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (2005)
Working Paper: Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:21

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