Custom-made healthcare: An experimental investigation

Claudia Keser, Claude Montmarquette, Martin Schmidt and Cornelius Schnitzler

No 218, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate in a controlled laboratory experiment physician behavior in the case of payment heterogeneity. In the experiment, each physician provides medical care to patients whose treatments are paid for either under fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP). We observe that physicians customize care in response to the payment system. A FFS patient receives considerably more medical care than the corresponding CAP patient with the same illness and treatment preference. Physicians over-serve FFS patients and under-serve CAP patients. After a CAP payment reduction in the experiment we observe neither a quantity reduction under CAP nor a spillover into the treatment of FFS patients.

Keywords: experimental economics; physician reimbursement; capitation; Fee-For-Service; customization; fee regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Custom-made health-care: an experimental investigation (2020)
Working Paper: Custom-made healthcare – An experimental investigation (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:218

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