Do I care if you are paid? A field experiment on charitable donations
Uri Gneezy,
Holger Rau,
Anya Samek and
Lilia Zhurakhovska
No 307, University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics from University of Goettingen, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This study investigates how information on solicitors' compensation affects charitable giving in a door-to-door field experiment with more than 2,800 households. We vary whether solicitors are paid or not and the information about this compensation that potential donors receive. Relative to the treatment in which potential donors are not informed about the solicitor's compensation, donations increase by 16% when potential donors are informed that solicitors are paid, but are not effected when donors are informed that solicitors are unpaid. The effect is driven by female donors, who increase their donations by 88%. Our findings suggest that if charities pay their solicitors, it could be beneficial to communicate this information to donors.
Keywords: charitable giving; field experiment; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cegedp:307
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