Exchange trading rules, surveillance and insider trading

Michael Aitken, Douglas Cumming and Feng Zhan

No 2013/15, CFS Working Paper Series from Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Abstract: We examine the impact of stock exchange trading rules and surveillance on the frequency and severity of suspected insider trading cases in 22 stock exchanges around the world over the period January 2003 through June 2011. Using new indices for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker-agency conflict based on the specific provisions of the trading rules of each stock exchange, along with surveillance to detect non-compliance with such rules, we show that more detailed exchange trading rules and surveillance over time and across markets significantly reduce the number of cases, but increase the profits per case.

Keywords: Insider trading; Surveillance; Exchange Trading Rules; Law and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G14 G18 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mst
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cfswop:201315

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