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"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation

Roland Kirstein and Neil Rickman

No 2002-11, CSLE Discussion Paper Series from Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics

Abstract: We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these ?Third Party Contingency? (TPC) contracts. Signing a TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only of mutual benefit to the plaintiff and the third party when the case settles out of court. We also find that the mere availability of TPCs may generate the above strategic effect.

Keywords: Contingent fees; British cost allocation rule; Legal Cost Insurance; strategic moves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 K41 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23125/1/2002-11_tpc.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: "Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: "Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: "Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation Downloads
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