How liable should an exporter be? The case of trade in hazardous goods

Carsten Helm

No 153, Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics from Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded goods like hazardous waste. If waste disposers of a small open economy are judgement-proof, then the extension of liability to waste exporters distorts the factor allocation and may reduce disposal care. Hence the optimal extension is partial at most. However, extending liability increases incentives of the waste importing country to hold domestic disposers liable. Interaction through the price system and through contracts that condition payments for disposal services on the occurrence of an accident yield identical outcomes if disposers are judgement-proof.

Keywords: extended liability; hazardous waste trade; externalities; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 F18 K13 Q38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32067/1/50436037X.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: How Liable should an Exporter be? The Case of Trade in Hazardous Goods (2009)
Journal Article: How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods (2008)
Working Paper: How Liable Should an Exporter Be? The Case of Trade in Hazardous Goods (2008)
Working Paper: How Liable should an Exporter be? The Case of Trade in Hazardous Goods (2005)
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