On the antitrust economics of the electronic books industry
Germain Gaudin and
Alexander White ()
No 147 [rev.], DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
When Apple entered the ebook market, prices rose. A recent court decision found Apple guilty of colluding with publishers, blaming the price hike, in part, on agency agreements and prohibiting their use. Building a model to compare these with traditional wholesale agreements, we identify a single, pivotal condition that leads prices under agency to be higher than under wholesale with two-part tariffs but lower with linear pricing. Our model shows that the increase in ebook prices can be explained, instead, by heightened competition for reading devices, and it guides our understanding of when restricting agency agreements is advisable.
Keywords: Electronic Books; Antitrust in High-Tech Industries; Vertical Contracting; Wholesale vs. Agency Agreements; Media Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D40 L23 L4 L42 L51 L82 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-ict, nep-ind and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: On the antitrust economics of the electronic books industry (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:147r
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().