Zero-rating and vertical content foreclosure
Thomas Jeitschko,
Soo Jin Kim () and
Aleksandr Yankelevich
No 317, DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Abstract:
We study zero-rating, a practice whereby an Internet service provider (ISP) that limits retail data consumption exempts certain content from that limit. This practice is particularly controversial when an ISP zero-rates its own vertically integrated content, because the data limit and ensuing overage charges impose an additional cost on rival content. We find that zero-rating and vertical integration are complementary in improving social welfare, though potentially at the expense of lower profit to an unaffiliated content provider. Moreover, allowing content providers to pay for zero-rating via a sponsored data plan raises welfare by inducing the ISP to zero-rate more content.
Keywords: Data Caps; Sponsored Data; Two-Sided Market; Vertical Content Foreclosure; Zero-Rating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L11 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/200151/1/1668746867.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Zero-Rating and Vertical Content Foreclosure (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:317
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in DICE Discussion Papers from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().