Against All Odds: Tentative Steps Toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups

Darius Schlangenotto, Wendelin Schnedler and Radovan Vadovic

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: When groups face difficult problems, the voice of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice is "lost" to such a degree that it is in fact optimal for all non-experts to contribute their bits of information. A single individual has little chance to improve the outcome and coordinating with the whole group is impossible. In this setting, we examine the change in behavior before and after people can talk to their neighbors. We find that the number of people who reduce noise by holding back their information strongly and significantly increases.

Keywords: information aggregation; coordination; communication; swing voter's curse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C99 D71 D72 D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/222533/1/sue31.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Against All Odds: Tentative Steps toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups (2020)
Working Paper: Against All Odds: Tentative Steps Toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:222533

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