Labour's law?

Elke Jahn and Thomas Wagner

No 6, Discussion Papers from Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics

Abstract: A cross section analysis of 23 OECD members shows that there is an 'antagonistic' relationship between the legal protection of investor interests on the one hand and labour interests on the other: the stronger the legal protection of investor rights in a country, the less developed are the individual and collective rights of labour and vice versa. A main cause for a country's position with respect to this trade off is its type of legal system, specifically whether it belongs to the common law or the civil law family. The established procedures of lawmaking and litigation in civil law countries decrease the organisation and influence costs of large interest groups, and increase their chances of institutionalising the income and protection goals of their members in the form of codified statutes.

Keywords: Labour Law; Legal Origin; Separation of Powers; Industrial Relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J53 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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