Works Councils and Workers' Party Preferences in Germany
Uwe Jirjahn and
Thi Xuan Thu Le
No 1228, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)
Abstract:
Research on the consequences of works councils has been dominated by economic aspects. Our study provides evidence that works councils have nonfinancial consequences for civic society that go beyond the narrow boundaries of the workplace. Using panel data from a large sample of male workers, the study shows that works councils have an influence on workers' party preferences. The presence of a works council is negatively associated with preferences for extreme right-wing parties and positively associated with preferences for the Social Democratic Party and The Left. These results holds in panel data estimations including a large set of controls and accounting for unobserved individual-specific factors. Our findings fit the notion that workplace democracy increases workers' generalized solidarity and their awareness of social and political issues.
Keywords: Workplace democracy; worker participation; political spillover; party identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J51 J52 J58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Works Councils and Workers' Party Preferences in Germany (2023) 
Working Paper: Works Councils and Workers' Party Preferences in Germany (2023) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:1228
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