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Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization

Gil Epstein () and Ira Gang ()

No 143, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Abstract: Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government’s taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralized with decentralized governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by interest groups trying to affect government taxation decisions. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of decentralization in taxation decisions.

Keywords: governance; decentralization; economic-models-of-political-processes; contests; rentseeking; intergovernmental-relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H77 D72 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-ure
Date: 2017
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/171280/1/GLO-DP-0143.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Taxation, Social Protection, and Governance Decentralization (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization (2016) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:143

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