Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization

Gil Epstein and Ira Gang

No wp-2016-101, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government's taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralized with decentralized governance.

Keywords: Institutional economics; Intergovernmental fiscal relations; State governments; Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Related works:
Working Paper: Taxation, Social Protection, and Governance Decentralization (2017)
Working Paper: Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization (2017)
Working Paper: Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization (2017)
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