Opening the Black Box of Works Council Elections: Theory and Evidence on the Factors Influencing Voter Turnout

Uwe Jirjahn, Jens Mohrenweiser and Stephen C. Smith

No 1806, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Abstract: Works councils have been often thought to contribute to workplace democracy. However, workplace democracy not only requires that works councils have the power to influence management decisions but also that this institution of establishment-level codetermination itself is based on democratic principles and processes. The most basic procedure of workplace democracy is the participation of workers in works council elections. Against this background, our study provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the factors that are associated with voter turnout in the elections. The study shows that the election procedure, establishment size, atypical employment, learning, type of establishment owner, economic circumstance, and union support have an influence on the turnout rate. We also find evidence that the role of a series of determinants of voter turnout depends on whether or not an establishment is covered by industry-level collective bargaining.

Keywords: Works Council Elections; Voting; Election Procedure; Collective Bargaining; Establishment Size; Atypical Employment; Learning; Ownership; Economic Situation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J50 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:1806

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