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Robustness Report on "Coercive Contract Enforcement: Law and the Labor Market in Nineteenth Century Industrial Britain", by Suresh Naidu and Noam Yuchtman (2013)

Douglas Campbell, Abel Brodeur, Magnus Johannesson, Joseph Kopecky, Lester Lusher and Nikita Tsoy

No 130, I4R Discussion Paper Series from The Institute for Replication (I4R)

Abstract: Naidu and Yuchtman (2013) find that labor demand shocks in 19th-century Britain had an impact on master and servant prosecutions, as breaking an employee contract was a criminal offense until 1875. We first reproduce all regression tables in Naidu and Yuchtman (2013) and then test for robustness by using a triple difference where we compare the impact of labor demand shocks on master and servant prosecutions relative to other prosecutions, changing the functional form of key variables, including region*year interactive fixed effects, and conducting influential analysis. We find that the results are sensitive to the triple difference specification and to region*year FEs, and otherwise robust. Overall, we find the results are robust in 50% of the checks we ran, and the t/z scores were on average 74% as large as the original study.

Keywords: Labor Law; Contract Law; Labor Contracts; Labor Market Institutions; Economic History (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 K12 K31 N33 N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-law
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