The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective

Alessio Brown, Christian Merkl and Dennis J. Snower

No 1906, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.

Keywords: minimum wage; labor market; employment; unemployment; job offer; job acceptance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J2 J3 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective (2014)
Working Paper: The Minimum Wage from a Two-Sided Perspective (2014)
Working Paper: The Minimum Wage from a Two-Sided Perspective (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1906

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