The Minimum Wage from a Two-Sided Perspective

Alessio Brown, Christian Merkl and Dennis J. Snower ()
Additional contact information
Dennis J. Snower: Hertie School of Governance

No 8252, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.

Keywords: job acceptance; minimum wage; labor market; employment; unemployment; job offer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J2 J3 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-ltv
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published - published in: Economics Letters, 2014, 124 (3), 389–391.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective (2014)
Working Paper: The Minimum Wage from a Two-Sided Perspective (2014)
Working Paper: The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective (2014)
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