EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse

David Freeman (), Erik Kimbrough and J. Philipp Reiss

No 101, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering

Abstract: Recent research suggests that auction winners sometimes fall prey to a "bidder's curse", paying more for an item at auction than they would have paid at a posted price. One explanation for this phenomenon is that bidders are inattentive to posted prices. We develop a model in which bidders' inattention, and subsequent overbidding, is driven by a rational response to the opportunity cost of acquiring information about the posted price. We test our model in a laboratory experiment in which subjects bid in an auction while facing an opportunity cost of looking up the posted price. We vary the opportunity cost, and we show that information acquisition decreases and consequently overbidding increases with opportunity cost as predicted.

Keywords: Auctions; Bidder's Curse; Limited Attention; Experiments; Rational Ignorance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/155326/1/880386851.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kitwps:101

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-29
Handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:101