Strategy-proofness and responsiveness imply minimal participation

Michael Müller and Clemens Puppe

No 138, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: We study a model in which agents with single-peaked preferences can participate in a costly voting procedure to determine the value of a one-dimensional variable. We show that, for all positive participation cost and all profiles of individual preferences, there exists a (generically) unique equilibrium with (at most) one single participant whenever the voting mechanism is strategy-proof, anonymous, and responsive in the sense that the outcome reacts to a unanimous move of the votes of all agents in the same direction.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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