Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Hans Peter Grüner and Carsten Hefeker

No 238, Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy"

Abstract: Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that monetary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetaiy Union (EMU) while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services.

Keywords: European Monetaiy Union; Interest Groups; Banking Policy; Bank Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 F3 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kondp2:238

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