Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Hans Grüner and Carsten Hefeker

Open Economies Review, 1996, vol. 7, issue 3, 183-198

Abstract: Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that montary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetary Union (EMU), while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: European Monetary Union; interest groups; banking policy; bank cooperation; E5; F3; G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01886820 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:openec:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:183-198

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/11079/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF01886820

Access Statistics for this article

Open Economies Review is currently edited by G.S. Tavlas

More articles in Open Economies Review from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().