EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values

André Casajus and Frank Hüttner

No 113, Working Papers from University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science

Abstract: The Shapley value certainly is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard characterization, the null player property indicates the absence of solidarity among the players. First, we replace the null player property by a new axiom that guarantees null players non-negative payoffs whenever the grand coalition's worth is non-negative. Second, the equal treatment property is strengthened into desirability. This way, we obtain a new characterization of the class of egalitarian Shapley values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. We complement this result by characterizations of the class of generalized consensus values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal surplus division solution.

Keywords: Solidarity; egalitarian Shapley value; equal division value; desirability; generalized consensus value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/62126/1/722035187.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:leiwps:113

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:zbw:leiwps:113