Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values

André Casajus and Frank Huettner

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, vol. 49, issue 1, 58-61

Abstract: The Shapley value probably is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard characterization, the null player property indicates the absence of solidarity among the players. First, we replace the null player property by a new axiom that guarantees null players non-negative payoffs whenever the grand coalition’s worth is non-negative. Second, the equal treatment property is strengthened into desirability. This way, we obtain a new characterization of the class of egalitarian Shapley values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. Within this characterization, additivity and desirability can be replaced by strong differential monotonicity, which translates higher productivity differentials into higher payoff differentials.

Keywords: Solidarity; Egalitarian Shapley value; Equal division value; Desirability; Strong differential monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (58)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:1:p:58-61

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.09.008

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