Stablecoin regulation: A comparative glance at U.S. and EU law

Katja Langenbucher

No 120, SAFE White Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: How should legislators and regulators cope with technological innovation in the field of financial services? Move quickly, top-down, to provide legal certainty - or let things develop bottom-up, with decentralised legislators and agency initiatives preparing the ground? Over the last years, stablecoins, i.e., crypto assets that are framed as payment instruments and promise stability through a peg to underlying reserves,2 have been a paradigm example for regulatory strategies and cultural differences between the U.S. and the EU. The U.S. has been inclined to take a bottom-up engagement, coupled with a distrust of government intervention, while the EU was more disposed towards quickly moving forward with comprehensive regulation, aimed at insulating financial consumers from anticipated harm.

Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/343097/1/1981834613.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewh:343097

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SAFE White Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().