BaFin (in)dependence - a reform proposal

Ann-Katrin Kaufhold, Katja Langenbucher, Patrick Blank and Jan Pieter Krahnen

No 82, SAFE White Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: In this paper we put forward a legal argument in favour of granting more independence to BaFin, the German securities market supervisor. Following the Wirecard scandal, our reform proposal aims at strengthening the impartiality and credibility of the German supervisor and, as a consequence, at restoring capital market integrity. In order to achieve the necessary degree of democratic legitimacy for giving BaFin more independence and disassociating it from the Ministry of Finance, the paper sets out the necessary steps for a legal reform that creates accountability of BaFin vis-à-vis the Parliament, subjecting it to strict disclosure and reporting obligations.

Keywords: Capital markets; supervision; Wirecard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewh:82

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