Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account

Werner Güth ()

No 1997,104, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: If one abstracts from specially organized markets like stock or commodity exchanges, (international) trade relies on bargaining between the interested parties. Whereas earlier the results of bargaining were seen as unpredictable or determined by an at most vaguely defined concept of (relative) bargaining power, it is simply a field of application in view of game theory. Our discussion tries to elaborate the specific institutional aspects of international bargaining with interacting parties from different countries. Especially, we concentrate on the problem when contracts resulting from international bargaining are unenforceable.

Date: 1997
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