A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction

Motty Perry, Elmar Wolfstetter and Shmuel Zamir ()

No 1998,63, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.

Keywords: Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/61249/1/721986854.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction (2000)
Working Paper: A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199863

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