A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction

Motty Perry, Elmar Wolfstetter and Shmuel Zamir ()

No 249, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.

Keywords: Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction (2000)
Working Paper: A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_249

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