Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study

Werner Güth (), Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Elmar Wolfstetter

No 2001,15, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.

Keywords: Experiments; Sealed Bid Auctions; Asymmetric Bidders; Private-Independent Values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200115

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