Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots

Gernot Sieg

No 4, Economics Department Working Paper Series from Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department

Abstract: Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g

Keywords: Airports; Grandfather rights; use-it-or-lose-it rule; airport slots (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 L93 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots (2010)
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