Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees

Alexander Kemnitz

No 08/07, Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics from Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates how the abolishment of a ban on tuition fees affects the quality of higher education with centralized and decentralized decision making. It is shown that tuition fees fully crowd public funds under centralization and quality of university education does not improve. However, with decentralized decisions total higher education spending increases in the tuition level. Therefore, decentralization can lead to a higher quality of university education than centralization although the opposite holds when funding is restricted to be public.

Keywords: Higher Education; Federalism; Tuition Fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H77 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/22749/1/DDPE200708.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees (2010)
Working Paper: Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0807

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