Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees

Alexander Kemnitz

No 3193, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper investigates how the abolishment of a ban on tuition fees affects the quality of higher education with centralized and decentralized decision making. It is shown that a marginal introduction of tuition fees fully crowds out public funds under centralization, whereas educational quality improves under decentralization. However, if the government has full discretion about the tuition fee level, centralization leads to the efficient quality, fully extracting the income gains from the graduates, while decentralization typically induces inefficiently low spending levels.

Keywords: higher education; federalism; tuition fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H77 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees (2007)
Working Paper: Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3193

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