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Would you like to be a prosumer? Information revelation, personalization and price discrimination in electronic markets

Karl Morasch and Martin Bandulet ()

No 2003,4, Working Papers in Economics from Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group

Abstract: Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but identical willingness to pay and another with high and low valuation customers. In both cases full revelation may only result if the monopolist can commit to a maximum price before consumers decide about disclosure.

Keywords: E-Commerce; Personalization; Asymmetric information; Price discrimination; Elektronische Märkte; Personalisierung; Asymmetrische Information; Preisdiskriminierung (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Would You Like to be a Prosumer? Information Revelation, Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Would You Like to Be a Prosumer?Information Revelation, Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets (2003) Downloads
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