Cheating alone and in teams

Alexander Dilger ()

No 1/2021, Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics from University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics

Abstract: There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analysed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context.

JEL-codes: D82 K42 Z20 Z22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/229960/1/1747925039.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:umiodp:12021

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics from University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().