Doping in teams: A simple decision theoretic model

Doping in Teams: Ein einfaches entscheidungstheoretisches Modell

Alexander Dilger ()

No 6/2017, Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics from University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics

Abstract: A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team member that at least some of its members dope. That there are not many proven cases of doping in team sports could be because doping is less effective or because the incentives to cover it are higher than in individual sports.

JEL-codes: D81 D82 K42 L83 Z20 Z22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mic and nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:umiodp:62017

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