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Simultaneous search and network efficiency

Christian Holzner and Pieter Gautier ()

Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: When workers send applications to vacancies they create a bipartite network. Coordination frictions arise if workers and firms only observe their own links. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. Only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network. We show that random search with ex post competition in wages leads to the maximum number of matches and is socially efficient in terms of vacancy creation, worker participation and the number of applications send out, if workers and not firms have the power to make offers.

JEL-codes: D83 D85 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
Date: 2013
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/79740/1/VfS_2013_pid_666.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency (2011) Downloads
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