Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency

Pieter Gautier and Christian Holzner

No 3522, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. Equilibria that exhibit wage dispersion is inefficient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall (firms can go back and forth between all their candidates) only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network.

Keywords: efficiency; network clearing; random bipartite network formation; simultaneous search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D85 E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3522.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Simultaneous search and network efficiency (2013)
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency (2011)
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency (2011)
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3522

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().