Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers

Sylvi Rzepka and Marcus Tamm

VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: The new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm-specific training but also for general training if the risk of poaching is limited. This implies that training participation should decrease when competition for employees is higher among firms. Using worker level data for Germany we find that the hypothesis is supported empirically. Specifi cally, we find that employees are significantly less likely to participate in training if the density of firms in a sector is higher within the local labor market.

JEL-codes: I20 J24 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/100344/1/VfS_2014_pid_51.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Local employer competition and training of workers (2016)
Working Paper: Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers (2013)
Working Paper: Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100344

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().