Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers

Sylvi Rzepka and Marcus Tamm

No 7853, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm-specific training but also for general training if the risk of poaching is limited. This implies that training participation should decrease when competition for employees is higher among firms. Using worker level data for Germany we find that the hypothesis is supported empirically. Specifically, we find that employees are significantly less likely to participate in training if the density of firms in a sector is higher within the local labor market.

Keywords: monopsony; local labor markets; training (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I24 J24 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2013-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Applied Economics, 2016, 48 (35), 3307-3321

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Related works:
Journal Article: Local employer competition and training of workers (2016)
Working Paper: Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers (2014)
Working Paper: Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers (2013)
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