Internal conflict, market uniformity, and transparency in price competition between teams

Michael Kurschilgen, Alexander Morell and Ori Weisel ()

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict, and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams, affects teams' ability to compete vis-à-vis each other, and, consequently, market outcomes. We find that internal conflict leads to (tacit) coordination on high prices in uniform private-pay duopolies, but places private-pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies. Competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets, but intensified in mixed markets.

JEL-codes: C92 D43 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Internal conflict, market uniformity, and transparency in price competition between teams (2017)
Working Paper: Internal conflict, market uniformity, and transparency in price competition between teams (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168057

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