Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication

Kiryl Khalmetski, Bettina Rockenbach and Peter Werner

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: In a sender-receiver game we investigate if sanctions for lying induce more truth-telling. Senders may not only choose between truth-telling and (explicit) lying, but may also engage in evasive lying by credibly pretending not to know. Sanctions promote truth-telling if senders cannot engage in evasive lying. If evasive lying is possible, explicit lying is largely substituted by evasive lying, in line with the notion that evasive lying is perceived as sufficiently less psychologically costly.

JEL-codes: C91 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evasive lying in strategic communication (2017)
Working Paper: Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168119

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