Disentangling Crowdfunding from Fraudfunding

Moein Karami, Douglas Cumming, Lars Hornuf and Denis Schweizer

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Using Kickstarter and Indiegogo, the two largest crowdfunding platforms, we conduct an exhaustive search of all fraud cases from 2010 through 2015. We present evidence that fraudsters in crowdfunding markets have specific characteristics: they are less likely to have engaged in prior crowdfunding activities, they are less likely to have a social media presence, and they are more likely to provide poorly worded and confusing campaign pitches.

JEL-codes: G21 G24 G32 K22 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Disentangling Crowdfunding from Fraudfunding (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168120

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