EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Nudging cooperation

Kai Barron () and Tuomas Nurminen

No SP II 2018-305, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies two simple interventions aimed at increasing public goods provision in settings in which accurate feedback about contributions is not available. The first intervention aims to exploit lying aversion by requiring subjects to send a non-verifiable ex post announcement about their contribution. The second intervention aims to nudge participants to higher contribution levels by simply labeling contributions of 16 or above as being ‘good’. We find that the ex post announcement mechanism does not have a significant effect on the cooperation rate. However, the nudge leads to a striking increase in the cooperation rate. We provide suggestive evidence that the nudge we use provides subjects with a focal point, helping conditional cooperators to coordinate their contributions. Moreover, despite the lack of monetary incentives to lie, we find that a non-negligible group of subjects inflate their anonymous announcements.

Keywords: cooperation; nudge; public good; experiment; lying; focal point (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C72 H41 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-soc
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/193680/1/B ... dgingCooperation.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2018305

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2019-11-08
Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2018305