Public statistics and private experience: Varying feedback information in a take-or-pass game

David Danz, Steffen Huck and Philippe Jehiel ()

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they make use of this information even if it is less precise than their own private statistics - except for very high stakes. Making public information more precise has two consequences: It is also used when the stakes are very high and it reduces the number of subjects who ignore any information - public and private. That is, precise public information crowds in the use of own information. Finally, our results shed some light on unravelling in centipede games.

Keywords: backward induction; analogy-based expectation equilibrium; learning; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/129102/1/849698669.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game (2016)
Journal Article: Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game (2016)
Working Paper: Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game (2016)
Working Paper: Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game (2016)
Working Paper: Public statistics and private experience: Varying feedback information in a take or pass game (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2016201

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().