Bribery: Greed versus reciprocity

Uri Gneezy, Silvia Saccardo and Roel van Veldhuizen

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: It is estimated that a trillion dollars are annually exchanged in bribes, distorting justice and economic efficiency. In a novel experiment, we investigate the drivers of bribery. Two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her judgment. An extra-laboratory experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. Hence, our participants are influenced by bribes out of greed, and not because of a desire to reciprocate.

Keywords: Bribery; Reciprocity; Laboratory Experiment; Extra-Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2016203

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