Teams promise but do not deliver

Kirby Nielsen, Puja Bhattacharya, John Kagel and Arjun Sengupta

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for the team outcome, ruling out explanations that team payoff structures drive b ehavior. Analysis of within-team discussions provides insight into the decision-making processes of first and second movers.

Keywords: trust game; hidden-action; non-binding communication; teams versus individuals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2019207

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