Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

Mindeststeuern können Steuerwettbewerb verstärken

Kai Konrad

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.

Keywords: Corporate income; capital income; taxation; tax competition; minimum tax; tax coordination; Stackelberg (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51104/1/562833870.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition (2009)
Working Paper: Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200810

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().